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A B S T R A C T
The Brazilian government aims to increase the share of biofuels in the energy mix to around 18% by 2030, which
implies an increase of ethanol production from currently 27 bln liters to over 50 bln liters per year. Biofuel
policies play an important role in ethanol production, consumption, and investment in processing capacity.
Nevertheless, a clear understanding of how current policies affect the evolution of the market is lacking. We
developed a spatially-explicit agent-based model to analyze the impact of different blend mandates and taxes
levied on gasoline, hydrous, and anhydrous ethanol on investment in processing capacity and on production and
consumption of ethanol. The model uses land use projections by the PCRaster Land Use Change model and
incorporates the institutions governing the actors’ strategic decision making with regard to production and
consumption of ethanol, and the institutions governing the interaction among actors. From the investigated mix
of policy measures, we find that an increase of the gasoline tax leads to the highest increased investments in
sugarcane processing capacity. We also find that a gasoline tax above 1.23 R$/l and a tax exemption for hydrous
ethanol may lead to doubling the production of ethanol by 2030 (relative to 2016).
1. Introduction
During the 2015 United Nations climate conference in Paris, Brazil
indicated that bioenergy will significantly contribute towards their
realization of climate objectives. The Brazilian government aims to
increase the share of biofuels in the energy mix to around 18% by 2030
(Federative Republic of Brazil, 2015), which implies that ethanol de-
mand will increase from 27 bln liters per year in 2016 to more than 50
bln liters in 2030 (IEA, 2017). If this projected demand for ethanol is to
be met by domestic supply, it would be necessary to double the pro-
duction of ethanol in the next years. It is expected that over 70% of the
increase in ethanol supply is to be met by hydrous ethanol because of
the technical blend constraints of anhydrous ethanol in the fuel market
(Tolmasquim et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the feasibility of achieving this
increase in ethanol supply with the current set of policies is unclear.
The effect of existing Brazilian policies on the evolution of the ethanol
market is not well understood (De Gorter et al., 2013).
The Brazilian experience with biofuels dates back to the early part
of the last century. Nevertheless, it was not until the global crisis in
1970 that the Brazilian government initiated the large scale im-
plementation of ethanol in Brazil with the ProAlcool program (Rosillo-
Calle and Cortez, 1998). Since then, Brazil has become the world's top
producer of sugar and, until 2005, the top producer of ethanol.
Nowadays, Brazil has the second largest production of ethanol after the
U.S. de Carvalho et al. (2016). Key success factors of the Brazilian
ethanol market are the favorable environmental conditions, technolo-
gical innovations, and the governmental policy (Stattman et al., 2013).
On the technical side, technological innovations such as flex plants
and flex vehicles are at the core of the ethanol market structure. Flex
plants can produce flexible ratios of sugar and ethanol from sugarcane
(McKay et al., 2015). Based on the water content, ethanol can be
classified as: hydrous ethanol (up to 4.9% v/v of water) and anhydrous
ethanol (up to 0.4% v/v of water). Users of flex vehicles can switch back
and forth from E100 (hydrous ethanol) to gasohol (a blend of gasoline
and anhydrous ethanol, of which the max share of anhydrous ethanol is
27.5% v/v due to technical limitations) (Pacini and Silveira, 2011).
Indeed, this flexibility at both the supply and the demand side of the
market is one of the factors responsible for the success of ethanol in
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Brazil (Alonso-Pippo et al., 2013).
On the policy side, the governmental ethanol policy has undergone
many changes (Stattman et al., 2013). The ProAlcool program had
different phases (creation, consolidation, expansion, and political un-
certainty) with different characteristics (Rosillo-Calle and Cortez,
1998). The period 1979–1985 was marked by strong state intervention,
whereas the sugar and ethanol industry were deregulated in the 1990s.
In this period subsidies and regulation were gradually removed (Hira
and de Oliveira, 2009). The revitalization of the ethanol market was
triggered by the introduction of the flex vehicle in 2003 (de Freitas and
Kaneko, 2011).
The behavior of the Brazilian ethanol market is shaped by both
governance structures and policy instruments. The interaction between
farmers and mill/distillery owners is governed by the Conselho de
Produtores de Cana-de-Açúcar, Açúcar e Etanol do Estado de São Paulo
(CONSECANA-SP) mechanism. In this governance structure, the su-
garcane price is determined by two factors: the amount of total re-
coverable sugar (TRS) in the sugarcane and the prices of sugar and
ethanol on the domestic and foreign markets (Ferraz Dias de Moraes
and Zilberman, 2014). Policy instruments such as blend mandates, and
taxes levied on gasoline, hydrous, and anhydrous ethanol influence
patterns of demand and production of ethanol. For instance, when the
government increased the CIDE (Contribution for Intervention in the
Economic Domain) tax for gasoline in 2015, ethanol demand and
production increased (Barros and Berk, 2015). These instruments and
their interaction produce distortions in the ethanol market that might
shape both the development of the ethanol industry (Demczuk and
Padula, 2017; Khanna et al., 2016), and the share of biofuels in energy
consumption.
The understanding of the effect of policies on the ethanol market is
still limited. Analyses have been carried out to shed light on the effects
of U.S. policies on Brazilian markets (Archer and Szklo, 2016; Debnath
et al., 2017), on the ethanol-sugar-oil nexus (Bentivoglio et al., 2016),
on the effects of blending targets around the world on sugarcane de-
mand in Brazil (Banse et al., 2008; Lapola et al., 2009) and on the ef-
fects of Brazilian policies on ethanol markets (De Gorter et al., 2013;
Demczuk and Padula, 2017; Drabik et al., 2015; Cavalcanti et al.,
2012).
Studies using a structural economic model of the Brazilian ethanol
market include Drabik et al. (2015) and Demczuk and Padula (2017).
The mathematical model of Dabrik et al. indicated that a low gasoline
tax and a high tax exemption for anhydrous ethanol lead to a reduction
in both ethanol and sugar prices. Nevertheless, this model neglected the
effect of institutions at two levels. First, at the level of decision making,
the profit maximizing behavior by the flex plants that determines the
production of ethanol and sugar was not included. Although the authors
did take into account the shift in demand curves from E100 to gasohol,
this mechanism was imposed on the model. In reality, consumption
patterns for both fuels emerge as a result of the strategic behavior of the
flex vehicle users (Pacini and Silveira, 2011). Second, at the level of
governance structures, the model neglected the CONSECANA-SP me-
chanism that determines the sugarcane price.
Demczuk and Padula (2017) developed a system dynamic model to
analyze the effect of Brazilian policies on the development of the
ethanol industry. The authors argued that the liberalization of the ga-
soline prices and the homogenization of sales taxes on ethanol among
the Brazilian states could reduce uncertainty in the ethanol sector, and
thus encourage investments in technology and production capacity.
This modeling study incorporated the CONSECANA-SP mechanism, but
it neglected the profit maximizing behavior by the flex plants and the
arbitrage in the consumption of gasohol and hydrous ethanol by the flex
vehicle users, as well as the diversity among flex plants (e.g. they do not
produce the same sugar to ethanol ratio under the same market prices)
and among the flex vehicle users (e.g. they do not all consume the same
fuel given the same fuel prices).
In this study, we developed a spatially-explicit agent-based model of
the Brazilian ethanol/sugar market to explore the effect of biofuel po-
licies on the market behavior. The model accounts for the institutions
governing the actors’ strategic decision making with regard to pro-
duction of ethanol by including the profit maximization behavior of the
flex plants; the consumption of ethanol by including the arbitrage be-
havior of the users of the flex vehicles; and the investment in processing
capacity of sugarcane. The model is spatially explicit to account for the
influence of the location of the sugarcane fields and their availability on
the decision of investment in sugarcane processing capacity. The agent-
based model uses land use projections provided by the PCRaster Land
Use Change (PLUC) model (Verstegen et al., 2016) to explicitly account
for expansion of land for sugarcane production in specific locations. The
agent-based model also accounts for the interaction among actors by
incorporating the CONSECANA-SP and supply and demand mechan-
isms; for the diversity among actors by including differences in the
preferences in the consumption of ethanol of flex vehicles users, and
differences in the production ratio of sugar and ethanol of flex plants. In
particular, the model is used to shed light on the following research
question:
• What is the combined effect of different options for blend mandate
and tax levied on gasoline, hydrous, and anhydrous ethanol on the
development of the sugarcane-ethanol market in Brazil?
We focus only on sugarcane-ethanol (1st generation ethanol1) as it
is projected that the highest share in the production of ethanol in the
period 2017–2030 will come from sugarcane-ethanol. According to
Tolmasquim et al. (2016), 2nd generation ethanol2 will emerge in
considerable volumes as of 2023, reaching 2.5 billion liters in 2030.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description
of the concepts underpinning the model structure, an explanation of the
developed agent-based model, and the data used. The results are pre-
sented in Section 3, followed by a discussion in Section 4. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Theory and method
This section describes the methodological improvements performed
and considered crucial for modeling the ethanol market in Brazil.
2.1. System diagram and conceptual framework
Fig. 1 shows a system diagram of the Brazilian ethanol/sugar
market. The system is analyzed from the perspective of the Brazilian
government. It is assumed that the Brazilian government aims to in-
crease the share of ethanol in the energy matrix as well as encourage
expansion in sugarcane processing capacity of flex plants. While the
government has used policy instruments to spur the production and
consumption of ethanol such as investments in RD&D in universities
and research centers, subsidies to metallurgic industries and farmers,
fiscal policies (tax levied on gasoline, hydrous, and anhydrous ethanol),
and blend mandates, we focus on fiscal policies and blend mandates. It
is assumed that the behavior of the system is driven by a number of
external factors as depicted in Fig. 1.
The Brazilian ethanol market is a complex adaptive system. It
consists of heterogeneous actors (farmers, ethanol/sugar producers,
distributors, and end-users) interacting in a dynamic environment and
regulatory regime. Actors constantly adapt their behavior to changing
market prices and available supply of ethanol and sugar. Producers
1 1st generation ethanol refers to the ethanol that has been derived from
edible sources such as corn, starch, and sugarcane.
2 2nd generation ethanol refers to the ethanol that has been derived from
non-food biomass such as lignocellulosic biomass, agricultural residues or
waste, and non-food energy crops.
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adjust their production ratio between ethanol and sugar in accordance
to their own specific market expectation. Flex vehicle users switch from
E100 to gasohol if a significant increase in ethanol prices occurs, and
switch back in case of a decrease.
The system was conceptualized based on the tenet that an adequate
representation of a complex system stems from the integration of
knowledge of various domains and disciplines (van Dam et al., 2013).
The conceptual framework proposed by Moncada et al. (2017a) was
chosen as a starting point for analysis as it has been successfully used in
the analysis of how institutions affect the evolution of biofuel supply
chains in Germany (Moncada et al., 2017b). The basic principle of the
framework assumes that the behavior of the complex socio-technical
system is the result of the interaction of three elements: the physical
system, the network of actors, and institutions (see Fig. 2).
The physical system refers to the physical objects such as: farms,
mills/distilleries, and vehicles. The actors are the entities that make
decisions such as: farmers, mills/distillery owners, and end-users (car
owners). Finally, institutions are the rules that shape actors’ behavior.
Examples of institutions are: norms, regulations, technical and opera-
tional standards, legislation, policies, governance structures, and tra-
ditions (North, 1990).
Institutions interact with the network of actors at different levels. At
the level of one single actor, institutions (i.e. games) refer to the rules,
norms and shared strategies of individuals within an organization. In
the Brazilian ethanol market, the selection of a production ratio for
sugar/ethanol by refineries accounts for the interaction between
Fig. 1. System diagram with interacting actors of the Brazilian ethanol market.
Fig. 2. Conceptual framework adapted from Moncada et al. (2017a). The dashed black box line represents the system boundaries. The dashed red box line separates
the micro level from the macro level. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
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institutions and actor at this level. At one level of analysis higher (i.e.
institutional arrangements), institutions describe how different actors
interact. Usually, this interaction is carried through by three mechan-
isms: spot market, bilateral contracts, and vertical integration. In this
study, the interaction between farmers and mills/distillery owners is
governed by the CONSECANA-SP mechanism. At the same level of
analysis, it was assumed that the interaction between mills and car
drivers is governed by a supply-demand mechanism. That is, the price
and quantity of the fuels to be traded are determined by the intersection
of the supply and demand curves. In reality, however, distribution
companies and gas stations owners are responsible for a significant
share of the final prices because of cartel practices. At the highest level
of analysis (i.e. formal institutional environment), institutions refer to
the rules of the game. The blending mandate, tax exemptions, and the
promotion of flex vehicles are examples of institutions in the Brazilian
ethanol market. At this level, institutions are assumed to be exogenous.
We focus our analysis on the effect of the blend mandate and taxes
levied on gasoline, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol on the development
of the sugarcane-ethanol market.
The theories used to describe the interaction among different
building blocks are: complex adaptive systems (CAS), and rational
choice theory. CAS is used to describe how the macro behavior of the
system emerges as a result of the interactions among different system
components and how, in turn, these components adapt to the macro
behavior they created (Holland and Miller, 1991). Rational choice
theory is used to describe the decision making of mill owners and flex
vehicle owners with regard to the production and consumption of
ethanol, respectively (Browning et al., 2000).
Supported by these theories, the conceptual framework is for-
malized into an agent-based model to analyze the influence of formal
institutions on the evolution of the Brazilian sugarcane ethanol market.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) was chosen as a modeling paradigm for
its explicit bottom-up approach, easiness of including the effect of
preferences on actors’ decision making, the actors’ diversity, and actors’
adaptive behavior. These are necessary elements to describe a complex
adaptive system such as the Brazilian ethanol market. These elements
have been neglected by previous studies (De Gorter et al., 2013;
Demczuk and Padula, 2017; Drabik et al., 2015). Applications of ABM
in the analysis of socio-technical systems vary from economics (Padgett
et al., 2003; Boero et al., 2004; Robinson and Rai, 2015; Farmer and
Foley, 2009) to energy systems (Connolly et al., 2010; Bale et al., 2015;
Kuznetsova et al., 2014; Li and Shi, 2012; Rai and Henry, 2016) and
supply chains (van Dam et al., 2009; Behdani et al., 2010).
2.2. Modeling framework
The modeling framework consists of two building blocks: the PLUC
model and the agent-based model of the Brazilian sugar-ethanol
market. PLUC is a spatial explicit land use change model that stochas-
tically projects annual land use maps (Verstegen et al., 2012). In a
previous study, it has been applied to Brazil, for which it projects the
expansion and contraction of 11 different land use types between 2012
and 2030 at a 5×5 km resolution (Verstegen et al., 2016). As su-
garcane is one of the 11 land use types, this study provides us with
annual probability maps of the occurrence of sugarcane fields from
2012 to 2030. This information is supplied to the agent-based model of
the Brazilian market to model the expansion in the production of su-
garcane. It is assumed that this process of expansion is driven by an
increase in the demand for sugar or ethanol.
The structure of the agent-based model was designed using the
pattern-oriented-modeling approach (Grimm et al., 2005). Three pat-
terns guided the design: flexibility in the production of ethanol and
sugar, flexibility in the consumption of ethanol, and the location of
sugarcane availability. The model is spatially-explicit as the sugar
market is local, decentralized, and land for expansion is limited. The
following description of the agent-based model is based on the ODD
(Overview, Design concepts, and Details) protocol proposed by Grimm
et al., (2006). The model was implemented in NetLogo (Wilensky,
1999) along with the R extension of NetLogo (Thiele and Grimm,
2010).
2.2.1. Purpose
the aim of the model is to study the influence of various policy in-
struments on the expansion of the Brazilian sugarcane ethanol market.
Unlike previous thinking about the Brazilian ethanol market (De Gorter,
2013; Demczuk and Padula, 2017; Drabik, 2015), this model takes a
bottom-up approach. The impact of policies on both actors’ preferences
for production and consumption of ethanol, and actors’ interactions is
explicitly modeled.
A hallmark of the Brazilian ethanol market is its flexibility in both
production and consumption of ethanol. The mapping between policies
and actor behavior leads to a better description of the flexibility of the
ethanol market, which is the result of the aggregation of actors’ decision
making on production and consumption of ethanol.
2.2.2. Entities, state variables and scales
The entities in the model are the actors in the supply chain. Actors,
contrary to traditional economic analysis, behave based on their own
local information (i.e. actors have bounded rationality). Farmers, mills/
distillery owners, and drivers are the actors considered in our analysis
of the ethanol-market. Farmers perform the role of sugarcane producers
and suppliers; the main farmers’ state variables are: farm area, su-
garcane yield, and TRS yield. Mills/distillery owners perform the role of
sugar and ethanol producers and suppliers; the main mills/distillery
owners’ state variables are: type (flex plant, sugar plant, and ethanol
plant), sugarcane processing capacity, production costs, and production
ratio of sugar and ethanol. Vehicle owners perform the role of fuel
consumers; main vehicle owners’ state variables are: vehicle type (flex
vehicle,3 regular vehicle4), energy demand, and preferences in the
consumption of fuels. Farmers and mills are modeled spatially ex-
plicitly, whereas drivers are not. This is because we assumed that E100
and gasohol prices are uniform over space. The global environment
consists of the policy instruments (blend mandate, taxes on gasoline,
hydrous, and anhydrous ethanol), and the exogenous factors (annual
world market prices of sugar and gasoline, number of flex and gasohol
vehicles, sugar demand, and sugarcane and TSR content yield). The
temporal extent of the model is 18 years (2013–2030) and the time step
is one year. The model is spatially explicit, covering the whole of Brazil.
The PLUC input has a resolution of 5× 5 km.
2.2.3. Process overview and scheduling
the scheduling is formed by a set of events that take place sequen-
tially in discrete periods within a year. During harvest season, farmers
harvest sugarcane, negotiate with the mills agents about price and
quantity to be traded and deliver the sugarcane to the mill as it was
agreed. These transactions are decentralized and take place at different
locations. The interaction between farmers and mills agents is bound to
their spatial location. Mills only interact with farmers within a radius of
up to 50 km (Sant'Anna et al., 2016).
Mills/distillery owners store the sugarcane and maximize profits by
deciding on volumes of sugar, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol to be pro-
duced. In each time period, Mills/distillery owners produce sugar and
ethanol and ask prices and quantities to the sugar and fuel markets. Drivers
choose between E100 and gasohol based on relative prices. According to
the market outlook, mills agents decide about the expansion of the su-
garcane processing capacity. The new sugarcane processing capacity
starts operation at the third year of construction.
3 Flex vehicles can run in any combination of E100 (hydrous ethanol) with
gasohol (blend of gasoline and anhydrous ethanol).
4 Regular vehicles can only run with gasohol.
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2.2.4. Design concepts
The concepts underpinning the design of the agent-based model are
presented below.
Basic principle: The basic principle applied in the model is the ra-
tional choice theory. This theory is used to describe the decision making
on production of sugar and ethanol, and consumption of gasohol and
E100. Nevertheless, unlike previous studies (De Gorter et al., 2013;
Demczuk and Padula, 2017; Drabik et al., 2015), this model in-
corporates the influence of diversity in preferences in the decision
making process.
2.2.4.1. Emergence. Emergent system dynamics includes gasohol and
E100 prices, total production of sugar and ethanol, total demand for
gasohol and E100, and the expansion of the processing capacity of
sugarcane.
2.2.4.2. Adaptation. Flex mill owners and the drivers of flex vehicles
are the entities that exhibit adaptive behavior in the model. Owners of
flex mills adapt their production ratios of ethanol/sugar based on
market signals (see Fig. 3). This behavior is driven by a profit
maximization strategy. Thus, high prices of sugar (ethanol) lead to an
increase in the production of sugar (ethanol).
The decision of the flex mills about the volumes of sugar and
ethanol to be produced is modeled as an optimization problem as
presented below:
= =fmaxx x x i i, , 1
3
s h hm (1)
subject to:
x x 0.65s smin (2)
x x0.2 h hmax (3)
x x0.2 hm hmax (4)
where i is the profit derived from product i(sugar, hydrous, and an-
hydrous), xs is the ratio of sugar production to sugarcane processed (the
rest is used for ethanol production),xh is the ratio of hydrous production
to total ethanol production from sugarcane (the rest is anhydrous),xhm
is the ratio of hydrous production to total ethanol production from
molasses. xsmin is the minimum in the ratio of sugar production to su-
garcane processed, xhmax is the maximum in the ratio of hydrous pro-
duction to total ethanol production. Values for xsmin and xhmax differ
among mills. These values were obtained from a uniform distribution
x U a b( , )smin and x U c d( , )hmax for sugar and hydrous ethanol, re-
spectively. The intervals of the uniform distribution are determined in
the calibration of the model (see Appendix A).
To account for the influence of policy instruments (i.e. gasoline tax)
on the decision making about the volumes of hydrous and anhydrous
ethanol to be produced, it was assumed that the values in Eqs. (3) and
(4) are estimated based on the variation of the gasoline tax with respect
to the value of the gasoline tax used in the model calibration.5=t t tG G Gbaseline (5)





(6)= +x x xh hmax max (7)
where:
tG: difference in the gasoline tax with respect to the baseline.
tG: gasoline tax.
tGbaseline: gasoline tax in the baseline.
x : difference in the maximum production ratio of hydrous with
respect to the baseline.
Drivers of flex vehicles react to price signals and change from one
fuel to the other on a daily basis, for this type of vehicles can use either
ethanol or gasoline. The criterion for choosing ethanol (E100) as op-






where Tc is the drivers’ preference of the relative price between E100
and gasoline. Pethanol and Pgasoline are the prices for ethanol and gasoline,
respectively. On average, E100 is considered to deliver 70% of the
mileage of gasoline for the same volume of fuel. Thus, according to
classical economic theory, =T 0.7c , whereas in our model=T N m( , 0.1)c to account for the fact that some drivers have a pre-
ference for the consumption of ethanol even when this is not the op-
timal choice (Pacini and Silveira, 2011). The mean of the normal dis-
tribution (m) is calibrated (see Appendix A). Strategic behavior of
drivers as to buying gasohol/flex vehicles was neglected. The scope of
the model as to drivers’ decision making was limited to the choice of the
consumption of fuels.
2.2.4.3. Objectives. Flex mill owners are profit maximizing agents.
They aim to maximize their profits by shifting the production ratio of
sugar to ethanol. The production ratio is a measure of the sugarcane
used to produce sugar and ethanol. A technical constraint is that this
ratio has to be between 35% and 65% (De Gorter et al., 2015). Drivers
of flex vehicles aim to meet their energy demand by choosing between
gasohol and E100. Farmers aim to sell their entire sugarcane cultivation
to the owners of flex/distillery plants.
2.2.4.4. Learning/prediction. Mills forecast prices and demand for sugar
and ethanol (hydrous and anhydrous). The method used for forecasting
is the double exponential smoothing6 (Holton Wilson et al., 2002). The
forecasting is used to inform the decision making as to whether to
invest in a new flex plant or not. Agents lack any learning mechanisms.
2.2.4.5. Sensing. Farmers, owners of mills/distilleries and drivers are
assumed to know, without uncertainty, the global variables (i.e.,
market prices).
2.2.4.6. Interaction. Farmers directly interact with owners of mills/
distilleries in their neighborhood through the negotiation about a
contract for the supply of sugarcane. The main issue in the contract is
the sugarcane price. This interaction is modeled through the
CONSECANA-SP mechanism. Mills interact indirectly with
neighboring mills by competing for contracts with farmers in their
common sourcing region in the sugarcane market.
In the CONSECANA-SP mechanism the pricing of sugarcane is based
on two variables: the amount of total recoverable sugar (TRS), which
Fig. 3. Levels of decision as to production of sugar, hydrous, and anhydrous
ethanol. Each rhomboid represents a level of decision making in the model.
5 This equation was derived based on the assumption that owners of flex
plants will only produce hydrous ethanol when the gasoline tax increases to
2.46 R$/l.
6 The double exponential smoothing is a forecasting method. The forecast
value at any time is a function of all the available previous values. Nevertheless,
recent observations are given relatively more weight in forecasting than the
older observations. Unlike the simple exponential smoothing, the double ex-
ponential smoothing adds a growth factor to the equation to account for
changes in the trend.
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expresses the sugar content that is used for sugar and ethanol produc-
tion, and the price of TRS. Values of TRS per ton of sugarcane are given
to the farmer agents.
The TRS price is linked to the average market selling prices of three
different products (sugar, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol), over the
period of one harvest season. The CONSECANA-SP model then assumes
that sugarcane accounts for 59.5% of the production costs of sugar, and
accounts for 62.1% of ethanol production (Ferraz Dias de Moraes and















PsTRS, PhTRS, PaTRS are the TRS prices for sugar, hydrous ethanol, and
anhydrous ethanol, respectively, in Reais per kilogram of TRS. Psave,Phave,
Paave are the average market selling prices for sugar, hydrous ethanol,
and anhydrous ethanol in Reais per kilogram of sugar and Reais per
litre of ethanol, respectively. scs, sch, sca are the stoichiometric coeffi-
cient for sugar, hydrous ethanol, and anhydrous ethanol, respectively.
Nevertheless, the TRS price is unique for each processing plant as
sugar sales and ethanol sales volumes differ depending on the pro-
duction ratios of each processing facility. The TRS price for a processing
plant i is based on weighing the product TRS price with the volumes of
each product:















t (12)= + +Pr Pr Pr Prt s h a (13)
where:
PiTRS is the TRS price of the plant i in Reais per kg of TRS.Prs,Prh, and
Pra are the total production of sugar, hydrous ethanol, and anhydrous
ethanol of the plant i, respectively in kilograms of TRS.
The interaction between mills and drivers is mediated via the fuel
market. The concept of preference of the relative price between E100
and gasoline is at the core of the modeling of the fuel market. Let Q g0 ,
and Q e0 , be the initial demand (measured in GEELS7) of gasohol and
E100, respectively. Let P g0 , and P e0 be the initial market prices calcu-
lated at values of demand of gasohol and E100, respectively. When the
price gap between gasohol and E100 narrows, some flex car owners
who previously preferred hydrous ethanol will find it attractive to
switch to the blended fuel. In this case, the demand for gasohol in-
creases to Q g1 whereas the demand for E100 decreases to Q e1 . This
change in demand for fuels affects the relative price as new values for
the market prices are determined (P g1 ,P e1 ). This iterative process con-
tinues until the relative price remains constant (i.e. the equilibrium is
reached). This mechanism is shown in Fig. 4. The equilibrium is de-
scribed by the pairs (Q*g,P*g),(Q*e,P*e).
2.2.4.7. Stochasticity. The model is initialized stochastically. Properties
such as farmers’ yields, mills’ production capacities and drivers’
preferences of the relative fuel prices are randomly assigned among
the agents. The decision making of farmers agents about expansion of
sugarcane fields and the locations of new mills is modeled stochastically
based on the probabilities calculated by the PLUC model (Verstegen
et al., 2016).
2.2.4.8. Collectives. The model neglects the formation of aggregations
among individuals.
2.2.4.9. Observation. Expansion of the ethanol/sugar production
capacity, production of sugar and ethanol, demand of ethanol, and
ethanol prices are the main key performance indicators.
Initialization: 418 mill agents, 3715 farmer agents, and 2500 driver
agents are initialized for the year 2013. The location of mills and their
type (sugar plant, ethanol plant, and flex plant) are based on real spatial
data for the year 2013 (Picoli, 2013). The location of the farmers is
based on the stochastic projections of the PLUC model for 2013. Table 1
presents the parameters that describe the state of the agents at the start
of the simulation.
2.2.5. Input data
The behavior of the model is driven by 7 exogenous parameters:
gasoline and sugar prices, number of flex and regular vehicles, pro-
ductivity of both sugarcane and the TRS content, and sugar demand.
The productivity of both sugarcane and the TRS content is assumed to
be constant during the period 2013–2030. The values for sugarcane
yield and TRS content yield are 75 t/ha and 140 kg TRS/t, respectively.
These values were set out based on historical developments (UNICA,
2017). Projections for the other parameters up to 2030 were retrieved
from the literature (see Table 2). The number of vehicles is assumed to
be exogenous ought to that they are driven by macro-economic vari-
ables such as level of urbanization, population density, and the growth
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Prices can be either current
(nominal) prices or constant (real) prices as we assumed an inflation of
zero.
2.2.6. Submodels
The algorithm that describes the investment in new processing ca-
pacity consists of four steps. This algorithm is followed by every single
mill owner. The first step is to assess the financial status. It is assumed
that mill owners are willing to invest in new processing capacity if they
are making profits. The second step is to forecast the demand of sugar
and ethanol. If this demand is increasing, then mill owners determine
the profitability of building a new processing capacity by calculating
the net present value (NPV) of the project. Finally, if the project is
profitable (i.e. NPV>0), then mill owners invest in new processing
capacity. The values of the parameters used in the net present value
calculation are reported in Table 3–5. It is assumed that mill owners
have a different perception of risk in the investment. This difference in
the perception of the risk was captured by using different values for the
discount rate.
Critical assumptions that underpin the model structure are:
• Brazilian policies are constant during the modeled timeframe.• Brazil is an open system. That is, Brazil can either import or export
ethanol if required.• There are neither import tariffs nor export tariffs for ethanol.• The international price of ethanol is endogenous and it is calculated
based on the domestic price. The ratio of domestic price of ethanol
(both hydrous and anhydrous) to the international price of ethanol
is 1:1.3 (Crago et al., 2010).• The exchange rate of Brazilian Reais to US dollars is constant during
the timeframe.• The international demand for hydrous and anhydrous ethanol is a
sink. This demand is considered only when the domestic demand for
ethanol is already satisfied. Imports of ethanol are only considered if
there is a shortage in the domestic production.• The fuel preferences of drivers remain constant during the time-
frame of the simulation.• The share of electric vehicles in the road transport sector is negli-
gible during the timeframe of the simulation.• Economic resources are available for new investments in processing7 Gasoline energy equivalent liters.
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capacity of sugarcane.
2.3. Modeling the biofuel policies
The blend mandate and the taxes levied on gasoline and ethanol
shape the behavior of the ethanol market by influencing the ethanol
prices and the mandate for anhydrous ethanol. Ethanol prices along
with gasoline and sugar prices influence actors’ decision making on
production, consumption, and investment. The price of gasohol hinges
on the gasoline price, anhydrous ethanol price, gasoline tax, anhydrous
tax, and blend mandate. Similarly, the price of E100 hinges on the
hydrous ethanol price and the tax levied on hydrous ethanol. The total
supply of gasohol in the market is based on the total production of
anhydrous and the blend mandate. The total supply of E100 into the
market is equivalent to the total production of hydrous ethanol. Taxes
and blend mandates are assumed to be constant during the time frame
of the simulation. The mapping between biofuel policies and prices and





where PF , PA, PG, PE100, and PH are the price of gasohol, anhydrous
Fig. 4. Shifts in demand for gasohol and E100.8
Table 1
Parameters used in the initialization of the simulation (representing the year 2013).
Parameter Value Brief description Units
Farmers
initial-number-farmers 3715 initial number of farmers –
farm-a 2500 farm area ha
yield-SC 75 yield of sugarcane per hectare t/ha
yield-TRS 140 yield of total recoverable sugar per ton of sugarcane kg/t
Mills
number-sugar-mill-plants 10 number the sugar plants –
number-ethanol mill plants 83 number of ethanol plants –
initial-number-flex-mill-
plants
325 number the mills plants –
proc-capacitya (Brazil, 2015; Rosillo-Calle
and Cortez, 1998)
processing capacity of sugarcane Mt SC
yield-sugar-SCb U(119, 146) yield of sugar per ton of sugarcane kg/t
yield-hydrous-SCb U(83, 92) yield of hydrous ethanol per ton of sugarcane l/t
yield-anhydrous-SCb U(79, 88) yield of anhydrous ethanol per ton of sugarcane l/t
yield-ethanol-molasses U(8, 10) yield of ethanol from molasses per ton of sugarcane l/t
sugar-proc-cost U(41, 51) processing cost of sugar per ton of sugarcane R$/t
hydrous-proc-cost U(14, 17) processing cost of hydrous ethanol per ton of sugarcane R$/t
anhydrous-proc-cost U(25, 31) processing cost of anhydrous ethanol per ton of sugarcane R$/t
prod-ratio-sugarc U(0.5, 0.6) proportion of sugarcane that is used to produce sugar –
prod-ratio-hydrousc U(0.2,0.5) proportion of sugarcane that is used to produce hydrous ethanol –
prod-ratio-hydrous-molasses U(0.2, 0.5) proportion of ethanol produced from molasses that is used to produce hydrous ethanol –
Drivers
Type gasohol; flex –
Demand 47244 energy demand per vehicle MJ/y
preference-relative-pricec N(0.9, 0.1) value in the relative price that determines the consumption pattern of the driver i. Values of the relative
price higher than the individual relative price lead to consumption of gasohol by the driver
–
Global variables
blend-mandate 23 blend mandate %
tax-gasoline 1.23 tax levied on gasoline R$/l
tax-hydrous 0.30 tax levied on hydrous ethanol R$/l
tax-anhydrous 0.05 tax levied on anhydrous ethanol R$/l
a The distribution of the production capacity was based on Valdes (Valdes, 2011).
b It is assumed that the differences in the yields are due to differences in industrial efficiencies between mills/distilleries.
c The values in bold were obtained from the model calibration (see Appendix A).
8 GEEML: gasoline energy equivalent million liters.
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ethanol, gasoline, E100, and hydrous ethanol, respectively in Reais per
liter. tA, tG, and tH are the taxes levied on anhydrous ethanol, gasoline,
and hydrous ethanol, respectively in Reais per liter. denotes a blend
mandate for anhydrous ethanol. VA and VF are the volumes of anhy-
drous ethanol and gasohol, respectively in liters.
The structure of the fuel taxes in Brazil is complex. Taxes vary by
state and they may be changed at any point in time. To cope with this
complexity, we assumed that taxes remain constant during the time-
frame of the simulation. We also assumed homogeneity in the dis-
tribution of fuel taxes in Brazil. That is, fuel taxes are equally enacted in
the different states of Brazil. In this study, we use as a baseline the
values reported by De Gorter et al. (2013) for the period 2011/2012 in
the state of Sao Paulo. Based on this baseline scenario, we defined ex-
treme scenarios for the fuel taxes. One extreme consists of fuel taxes
equivalent to the double of those reported in the baseline. The other
extreme consists of tax free fuels. The blend mandate scenarios were
defined based on the baseline, the minimum requirement of blending,
and the blending wall. Table 6 presents the values used in the baseline
and extreme scenarios.
3. Results
In this section, we describe the results of the influence of three
different levels of blend mandate and tax levied on hydrous ethanol and
gasoline on the development of the sugarcane-ethanol market. We focus
on four relevant aspects: the expansion of sugarcane processing capa-
city, the location of new processing facilities, consumption patterns of
flex vehicle owners, and production of sugar, hydrous and anhydrous
ethanol.
The results are presented in a matrix of 9 panels defined by the
blend mandate and the gasoline tax variables. The effect of the hydrous
tax is presented by different colors in each panel. For a given tax levied
on anhydrous ethanol, the 9 panels describe all of the possible per-
mutations among blend mandate and taxes levied on gasoline and hy-
drous ethanol (see Table 6). The results presented below correspond to
a tax levied on anhydrous of 0.05 R$/l as the effect of the anhydrous tax
on investment in processing capacity, production and consumption of
ethanol is negligible (see Appendix B).
3.1. Spatial pattern and evolution of sugarcane processing capacity
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the evolution of the processing capacity for
different combinations of gasoline tax, blend mandates, and tax levied
on hydrous ethanol. As expected, the investment in new processing
capacity of sugarcane increased as the gasoline tax increase. In the
period 2020–2030, with a hydrous tax of 0.3 R$/l, the investment in
new processing capacity grows at the average rate of 0.38% (see
Fig. 5a) and 6.61% (see Fig. 5c) per year. The investment in new
Table 2







demanda priceb oil pricec Vehiclesd Vehiclesd,e
[Mt] [US$/kg] [US$/bbl] [millions] [millions]
2013 34.85 0.39 104.08 23 15
2014 35.92 0.37 96.20 26 14
2015 36.94 0.30 50.80 28 13
2016 37.88 0.40 42.80 30 13
2017 38.76 0.40 55.00 32 13
2018 39.58 0.40 60.00 35 13
2019 40.33 0.40 61.50 37 13
2020 41.01 0.40 62.90 40 13
2021 41.63 0.39 64.50 43 13
2022 42.19 0.39 66.00 46 13
2023 42.67 0.39 67.60 49 14
2024 43.09 0.39 69.30 53 14
2025 43.45 0.39 71.00 56 14
2026 43.74 0.39 72.80 59 14
2027 43.97 0.39 74.60 62 15
2028 44.13 0.38 76.40 66 16
2029 44.22 0.38 78.20 69 17
2030 44.25 0.38 80.00 73 17
a The demand of sugar was calculated based on results reported by the
MAGNET model (Jonker et al., 2016).
b Retrieved from (WorldBank, 2017). The ratio of domestic price of sugar to
the international price is 1:1.2 (Haley, 2013).
c The ratio of crude oil price to gasoline price is 1:1.2 (Zana, 2013).
d Retrieved from (Baran and Legey, 2013; Belincanta et al., 2016).
e Regular vehicles only can use gasohol (blend of gasoline and anhydrous
ethanol. The maximum blend of anhydrous ethanol in gasohol is 27.5% v/v).
Table 3
















1 32.05 8.84 32.13 8.88
3 69.16 26.52 101.83 26.64
5 98.89 44.19 173.02 44.44
a Include all the processing costs other than the feedstock cost.
b Based on the data reported in ((PECEGE, 2015)).
c Based on the data reported in (Jonker et al., 2015).
d Based on the data reported in (Santos et al., 2017).
Table 4
Financing and production assumptions.
Parameter Value Unit
plant lifetime 20 yr
installation time 3 yr
Income tax ratea 37 %
depreciation period 10 yr
discount rateb U(10,20) %
a Reference value for Brazil.
b Flex owners of flex plants differ in their perception of risk in the investment
decision. Here, we use the discount rate as proxy for risk perception. The dif-




Year TCI schedule Plant availability (% of capacity)
− 2 33,33% Fixed Capital 0
−1 33,33% Fixed Capital 0





Values used for the policy instruments in the baseline and extreme scenarios.
Policy instrument Scenario
Low Baseline High Units
Gasoline tax 0 1.23 2.46 R$/l
Hydrous ethanol tax 0 0.3 0.6 R$/l
Anhydrous ethanol tax 0 0.05 0.1 R$/l
Blend mandate 20 23 26 %
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processing capacity increased as the blend mandate increased only
when the tax levied on gasoline was 0 R$/l and 1.23 R$/l, respectively.
In the period 2020–2030, with a tax levied on hydrous ethanol of 0.6 R
$/l, the investment in new processing capacity grows at the average
rate of 0.45% (see Fig. 5a) and 2.53% (see Fig. 5g) per year. With a
gasoline tax of 2.46 R$/l, the effect of the blend mandate on the in-
vestment of processing capacity of sugarcane was negligible.
The hydrous tax only caused difference between scenarios in the
investment of new processing capacity of sugarcane when the gasoline
tax was 1.23 R$/l. The investment in new processing capacity was
higher when the hydrous tax was 0.3 R$/l. In the period 2020–2030,
when the taxes levied on hydrous ethanol are 0 R$/l, 0.3 R$/l, and
0.6 R$/l, the investment in new processing capacity grows at the
average rate of 2.94%, 3.89%, and 2.43% per year, respectively (see
Fig. 5b). This behavior is because in this regime both prices of hydrous
and anhydrous ethanol influence the decision making on investment in
new processing capacity. When there is a tax exemption for hydrous
ethanol, the demand for hydrous ethanol increases, which leads to an
increase in the price of hydrous ethanol and to a decrease in the price of
anhydrous ethanol. Nevertheless, the increase in hydrous price is in-
sufficient to offset the effect of low anhydrous price on the investment
decision. A similar mechanism is activated when the tax levied on hy-
drous ethanol is 0.6 R$/l. In this case, the increase in anhydrous ethanol
price is insufficient to offset the effect of low hydrous price on the in-
vestment decision. Therefore, the investment in total sugarcane pro-
cessing capacity when the hydrous tax is 0 R$/l and 0.6 R$/l is less than
that invested when the hydrous tax is 0.3 R$/l. The effect of the tax
levied on anhydrous ethanol on the expansion of the processing capa-
city was negligible (see Appendix B).
The spatial pattern (Fig. 6) shows that the expansion started in the
center of Sao Paulo state, moved to Goiás and a small part of Mato
Grosso, and finalized in the west side of Mato Grosso do Sul state. The
majority of processing capacity of these plants was approximately 5 Mt.
An increase in the gasoline tax led to a continuous deployment of new
plants across the timeframe, resulting in a more pronounced east-west
expansion pattern.
3.2. Consumption patterns of flex vehicles
The percentage of owners of vehicles (flex and gasohol) demanding
E100 (hydrous ethanol) was influenced by the interaction between the
gasoline tax and hydrous tax (Fig. 7). In 2030, the mean percentage of
consumers of E100 increases 20% when the gasoline tax increases from
1.23 R$/l to 2.46 R$/l and there is a tax exemption on hydrous ethanol.
For hydrous taxes of 0, 0.3, and 0.6 R$/l, the mean percentage of
consumers of E100 in 2020 is 60%, 41%, and 29%, respectively (see
Fig. 7f). In general, an increase in the gasoline tax and a reduction in
the hydrous tax led to an increase in the consumption of hydrous
ethanol. As expected, a tax exemption on gasoline led to very low
consumption of ethanol.
At values of gasoline tax of 1.23 and 2.46 R$/l, the development of
crude oil prices influenced the behavior of the consumption patterns of
flex vehicles users (see Table 2, column 4). This pattern is characterized
by a dip in the consumption of E100 in 2017. The consumption patterns
of owner of flex vehicle were independent of the level of blend man-
date. The effect of the tax levied on anhydrous on the share of flex
vehicle users consuming E100 was also negligible (see Appendix B).
3.3. Production of sugar, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol
Patterns in the production of sugar are connected to patterns in the
expansion of processing capacity (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 8). This connection
hinges on the gasoline tax. A tax free gasoline regime favors the pro-
duction of sugar compared to ethanol. The production of sugar,
Fig. 5. Sugarcane processing capacity as a function of time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol. Tax on
gasoline and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax=0.05 R$/l. Forty repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination
of policy instruments. Dots and the err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation over these forty repetitions, respectively.
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however, is limited by the rate of expansion of processing capacity. On
the contrary, in a regime characterized by a high gasoline tax, the
production of sugar is driven by the rate of expansion of processing
capacity as this regime favors the production of ethanol. The effect of
the blend mandate, tax levied on hydrous ethanol and anhydrous
ethanol (see Appendix B) on sugar production is negligible.
As shown in Fig. 9, an increase in the gasoline tax led to an increase
in the production of hydrous ethanol and to a decrease in the produc-
tion of anhydrous ethanol. Furthermore, an increase in the tax levied on
hydrous ethanol led to a decrease in the production of hydrous ethanol
and to an increase in the production of anhydrous ethanol. When there
was a tax exemption for gasoline, the effect of the hydrous tax on the
production of both hydrous and anhydrous ethanol was negligible.
For values in the blend mandate of 23% and 26%, a gasoline tax of
1.23 R$/l, hydrous tax of 0.3 R$/l, and anhydrous tax of 0.05 R$/l, an
oscillating behavior was observed in the production of hydrous and
anhydrous ethanol. This behavior is due to the interplay of two factors.
First, the fuel choice of owners of flex vehicles shifts between two states
when the tax levied on hydrous ethanol is 0.3 R$/l. The second factor is
the myopic behavior of the owners of the mills plants as to production
of ethanol. In economic theory, this oscillating behavior in the pro-
duction of ethanol is described by the Cobweb theory (Ezekiel, 1938).
The dip in the production of hydrous ethanol in 2014, when the
gasoline tax was 2.46 R$/l, is due to two factors: the myopic behavior of
Fig. 6. Location, year of installation, and processing capacity of sugarcane plants as a function of different combinations of blend mandate and gasoline tax. Tax on
gasoline in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Hydrous tax=0.3 R$/l. Anhydrous tax= 0.05 R$/l. This figure shows the results for a single simulation run. To show that
the patterns shown here are representative across runs with the same policy instrument values, results for another simulation run out of the forty repetitions are
presented in Appendix B.
J.A. Moncada et al. Energy Policy 123 (2018) 619–641
628
Fig. 7. Percentage of flex vehicle owners that consume E100 over time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol.
Tax on gasoline and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax= 0.05 R$/l. Dots and err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation,
respectively. Forty repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
Fig. 8. Total production of sugar in Brazil over time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol. Tax on gasoline and
hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax=0.05 R$/l. Dots and err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation, respectively. Forty
repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
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Fig. 9. Total production of hydrous (a) and anhydrous ethanol (b) in Brazil over time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and
hydrous ethanol. Tax on gasoline and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax= 0.05 R$/l. Dots and err bars represent the mean and the
standard deviation, respectively. Forty repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
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owners of flex plants and the extreme options as to the production of
hydrous and anhydrous ethanol. At this level of the gasoline tax, flex
plants are incentivized to produce only hydrous ethanol unless the price
of anhydrous ethanol is high enough, in that case, flex plants drastically
reduce the production of hydrous ethanol. This situation happened in
2013, when the crude oil price was high, which led mill owners to
reduce the production of hydrous ethanol in 2014 because of their
myopic behavior.
For a gasoline tax of 1.23 R$/l and a hydrous tax of 0.3 R$/l, an
increase in the blend mandate magnified the oscillating behavior in the
production of both hydrous and anhydrous ethanol. For the rest of
permutations between gasoline tax and hydrous tax, the effect of the
blend mandate on the production of hydrous and anhydrous was neg-
ligible. As shown in Appendix B, the effect of the anhydrous ethanol tax
on the production of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol was also negli-
gible.
4. Discussion
We found that under the set of chosen policy measures, the ex-
pansion of the sugarcane processing capacity in Brazil is driven most by
a high gasoline tax (see Fig. 5), provided that the policy landscape re-
mains stable, that the effect of import and export tariffs on the market is
negligible, and that the share of electric vehicles in the road transport
sector remains small up to 2030. This insight is in line with that re-
ported by Demczuk and Padula (2017).
An increase of the gasoline tax leads to a continuous deployment of
new plants between 2015 and 2030. The pattern of expansion shows an
east to west pattern, from Sao Paulo state to Goiás, Mato Grosso, and
Mato Grosso do Sul (see Fig. 6). These patterns are in line with those
reported by Lapola et al., (2009), for it is expected that the deployment
of new processing capacity will take place predominantly on productive
lands. Also, a general trend was found in the deployment of new pro-
cessing capacity. This trend is characterized by the deployment of large
scale sugarcane processing capacity plants. This finding is in line with
the results reported by Jonker et al. (2016).
We found that the consumption pattern of the owners of flex ve-
hicles hinges on the interaction among gasoline prices and taxes levied
on gasoline (see Fig. 7). Namely, the gasoline tax exhibits a correlated
effect on E100 demand. This finding is in line with those of de Freitas
and Kaneko (2011). Finally, we found that the production patterns of
sugar, hydrous and anhydrous ethanol are influenced by the gasoline
tax (see Fig. 8 and Fig. 9). A tax-free regime favors the production of
sugar compared to ethanol but limits the increase in its production over
time. An increase in the gasoline tax leads to an increase in the pro-
duction of hydrous ethanol and to a decrease in the production of an-
hydrous ethanol.
For the Brazilian government that strives for enhanced consumption
of renewable fuels in the energy mix, our findings suggest that an in-
crease in the gasoline tax (above 1.23 R$/l) and a reduction in the
hydrous tax (less than 0.3 R$/l) may lead to doubling the production of
ethanol by 2030 (relative to 2016). Nevertheless, the government needs
to be cautious when implementing this policy as it can have negative
impacts on the productivity level of ethanol producers or in the ethanol
prices. The gasoline tax may disincentive ethanol producers in striving
for technological improvements as this protection mechanism guar-
antee that ethanol is competitive with gasoline. One subject that re-
mains to be explored is to what extent the gasoline tax should be in-
creased to incentivize the investment in processing capacity.
5. Summary and conclusions
This study was conducted to answer the following research ques-
tion: what is the combined effect of a blend mandate and a tax levied on
gasoline, hydrous, and anhydrous ethanol on the development of the
ethanol market in Brazil? To answer this question, we developed an
agent-based model of the Brazilian ethanol market.
We found that the evolution of the Brazilian ethanol market is
driven mostly by a gasoline tax. A high gasoline tax leads to increased
investment in sugarcane processing capacity, to an increase in the
consumption of E100, and to an increase in the production of hydrous
ethanol. Given that the Brazilian government aims to increase the
consumption of hydrous ethanol in the energy mix in 2030, and thus
needs to double the supply of ethanol, our findings suggest that this
goal is achievable if the gasoline tax is increased above 1.23 R$/l and
the hydrous ethanol is tax-free.
Our study applies a number of key enhancements to prior studies.
First, it models the expansion of the sugarcane processing capacity in
Brazil spatially-explicit, as the investment decision making in new su-
garcane processing capacity is bound to the land availability and lo-
cation (van der Hilst, 2018). Second, it incorporates the CONSEC-
ANA-SP mechanism to model the interaction between farmers and
producers. Finally, it includes preferences in and variation between the
decision making of consumers. Overall, these characteristics have been
neglected in previous analyses to ensure mathematical tractability and
rigor. As we show here, agent-based modeling allows a richer descrip-
tion of the system without sacrificing the desirable rigor of formal
analysis.
This approach, however, does have some limitations. First, the
current instability of the policy landscape in Brazil is neglected. The
policy instruments are subject to change in shorter time frames. For
instance, in reality, the blend mandate is adjusted depending on the
industry capacity to deliver ethanol, oil prices, and size of the fleet. This
instability might increase the perceived risk level in decisions on
whether or not to invest in processing capacity. Second, technological
innovations in the road transport sector have been neglected. The in-
troduction of e.g., electric vehicles, can drastically change fuel con-
sumption patterns. Third, the effect of import and export tariffs on the
Brazilian ethanol market is neglected. Fourth, we neglected the role of
distribution companies and gas stations owners on the final prices of
ethanol.
Moreover, the heuristics used to model the decision making as to the
production of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol under extreme values of
the gasoline tax (0 R$/l and 2.46 R$/l) need to be improved. Further
research should map the relationship between gasoline tax and decision
making as to ethanol production. Given the important role that dis-
tribution companies and gas station owners play on the determination
of ethanol prices, we also recommend to investigate the effect of the
market power of distribution companies and gas stations owners on the
evolution of the Brazilian sugarcane-ethanol supply chain, and what
factors play an important role in the emergence of these cartels. We also
recommend assessing the impacts of the variation of taxes and man-
dates by state on the evolution of the system, as favorable tax regimes
may incentivize the production of ethanol in expansion areas. Finally,
inasmuch as the Brazilian policy landscape is leaning to spur the pro-
duction of advanced biofuels (2nd generation biofuels), we recommend
researching the emergence of 2nd generation ethanol supply chains and
their co-evolution with sugarcane-ethanol supply chains in the Brazilian
context.
Yet, this study provides new insights into the workings of the
Brazilian ethanol market under different policy landscapes. A further
step would be the institutional design of the Brazilian ethanol market.
The approach proposed in this study could be used to guide the in-
stitutional design process. Namely, the agent-based model could be
used to assess the impact of different, potentially new, policy instru-
ments on the ethanol market. Specifically, policy instruments aimed to
increase both investments in sugarcane processing capacity and hy-
drous ethanol production.
All in all, as biomass/biofuel markets are complex and context-de-
pendent, we argue that we should strive for developing models that
incorporate the necessary mechanisms for a reliable description of the
problem at hand, instead of using only one modeling paradigm (i.e.
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Computational General/Partial Equilibrium Models) to analyze dif-
ferent problems in different geographies. This study is a step forward in
the development of an ecology of models that provides a richer de-
scription of biomass/biofuels markets. The agent-based model devel-
oped in this study illustrates how to incorporate the effect of pre-
ferences into the actors’ decision making, how to include governance
structures, and how to map biofuel policies onto actor behavior. As we
show here, these elements and their interaction are necessary to pro-
duce system behavior. Notwithstanding their importance, these ele-
ments are neglected by mainstream approaches.
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Appendix A. Model calibration
This appendix describes the method used to estimate the parameters with high uncertainty in the model. It also presents the results obtained from
the model calibration, and discusses the fit between historical data and model outcomes.
Some of the sources of high uncertainty in the model are the preferences in production of sugar and ethanol as well as preferences in the
consumption of fuel. We incorporate the preferences in production of sugar and ethanol into the model by using the parameters: minimum production
ratio of sugar to ethanol and maximum production ratio of hydrous ethanol to anhydrous ethanol. The minimum production ratio of sugar establishes the
lower limit in the production of sugar compared to ethanol. This limit cannot be lower than the technical constraint (i.e 35%). The maximum
production of hydrous ethanol establishes the maximum production of hydrous ethanol compared to anhydrous ethanol. Similarly, we incorporate
preferences in consumption of E100 (hydrous ethanol) compared to gasohol (blend of gasoline with anhydrous ethanol) into the model by using the
parameter preference in the relative price of ethanol to gasohol.
These preferences in production of ethanol and sugar as well as in consumption of ethanol vary among individual actors. To account for this
heterogeneity in the preferences, we distributed these preferences among actors by assuming either a uniform or normal distribution. The parameters
used to model these distributions were estimated based on historical data.
The approach used for the model calibration was best-fit calibration.9 The model was calibrated for the period 2013–2016. The mean squared
error was used as a measure of model fit to the time series. The calibration criteria are presented in Table A.1.
The objective function to be minimized is:
= =f MSEi i1
3
(A.1)






where f is the objective function to be minimized, and MSEi is the mean squared error of them calibration criterion i. Yˆ is the vector of n predictions,
and Y is the vector of observed values. It was assumed that the policy landscape remains stable during the period 2013–2016. The values of the
policy instruments used in the minimization of the objective function are reported in Table A.2.
The results of the minimization of the objective function are presented in Fig. A.1. It was found that the effect of the minimum production ratio of
sugar to ethanol on the objective function was negligible. When the values in the relative price of ethanol to gasohol were greater than 0.6, the
objective function displayed a clearer pattern. This pattern was characterized for both exhibiting a minimum value for the objective function and for
being robust. Table A.3 reports the values that yield a minimum in the objective function.
Table A.1
Calibration criteria.
Year Production ratio [%] Production ratio [%] Consumption ratio [%]
Sugar Ethanol Hydrous Anhydrous Hydrous Anhydrous
2013 45.20 54.80 55.64 44.36 54.79 45.21
2014 43.20 57.00 57.59 42.41 53.95 46.05
2015 40.60 59.40 61.43 38.57 62.03 37.97
2016 46.30 53.70 57.48 42.52 55.67 44.33
Table A.2
Policy instruments.
Policy instrument Value Units
Blend mandate 23 %
Tax levied on gasoline 1.23 R$/l
Tax levied on hydrous ethanol 0.3 R$/l
Tax levied on anhydrous ethanol 0.05 R$/l
9 Railsback, S. and V. Grimm, Agent-based and individual-based modeling: A practical introduction. 2011: Princeton University Press.
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A comparison between the model outcomes and historical data is presented in Figs. A.2–A.4. These figures show the median and the 90%
envelope of the results obtained from the agent-based model developed in this study. Model outcomes were distilled from simulations that used the
values reported in Table A.2 and Table A.3. The simulations consisted of 1000 repetitions. The historical data used for the model calibration
(reported by UNICA10) is also presented in the figures.
Model results for consumption ratio of hydrous to anhydrous ethanol were the calibration criterion that exhibited higher deviations with his-
torical data (see Fig. A.2). These deviations are because of the assumption of a stable policy landscape. Patterns in consumption ratio of hydrous to
anhydrous ethanol are sensitive to the policy landscape, for the policies analyzed in this study aim to directly steer the drivers’ consumption patterns.
The higher difference between model outcomes and historical data for production ratio of hydrous ethanol to anhydrous ethanol occurred in the
year 2015 (see Fig. A.3). This discrepancy might be explained by the increase of the contribution for intervention in economic domain (CIDE) for
gasoline in 2015.12 This increase in the gasoline price led to higher demand for hydrous ethanol as consumers decisions are driven by the ratio
Table A.3
Results of the calibration.
Parameter Value
min production ratio sugar to ethanola 0.5
max production ratio hydrous to anhydrous (in ethanol)a 0.5
preference in the relative price of ethanol to gasoholb 0.9
a. the parameter calibrated is used to calculate the interval [a, b] of a uniform dis-
tribution.
a= parameter− (parameter * percentage-deviation).
b= parameter+ (parameter * percentage-deviation).
The percentage of deviation is assumed to have a value of 10%.
b. the parameter calibrated corresponds to the mean of a normal distribution. The
standard deviation was assumed to have a value of 0.1. We use this value in the
standard deviation to ensure that the distribution of the parameters lies on the specific
interval in which the parameters have realistic values. From economic theory, these
values lie around 0.7 (see Pacini and Silveira (2011))11.
Fig. A.1. Minimization of the objective function as a function of the mean of production ratio of hydrous, the mean of production ratio of sugar, and the mean in the
drivers relative preference for relative price.
10 UNICA. unicadata. 2017; Available from: http://www.unicadata.com.br/index.php?idioma=2.
11 Pacini, H. and S. Silveira. Consumer choice between ethanol and gasoline: lessons from Brazil and Sweden. Energy Policy, 2011. 39(11): p. 6936-6942.
12 Barros, S., C. Berk, Brazil. Biofuels Anual. Biofuels - Ethanol and Biodiesel, in: GAIN report. 2015, USDA Foreign Agriculture Service.
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between ethanol and gasoline prices in the pump. Major demand for hydrous ethanol led to an increase in the price of hydrous ethanol, and thus to a
decrease in the production of anhydrous. This behavior was neglected by the model because of the assumption that policy instruments remain
constant during the timeframe of the simulation. The agreement between the historical data and model outcomes for the production ratio of sugar to
ethanol is high (see Fig. A.4). With exception of the results related with the consumption ratio of hydrous to anhydrous ethanol, the model results
exhibited a similar dynamic reported to that reported in the historical data.
Appendix B. Model results
This appendix presents the results of the effect of fuel taxes and blend mandate on investment in production capacity, sugar and ethanol
production, and ethanol demand. The results are presented in a matrix of 9 panels defined by the blend mandate and the gasoline tax variables. The
effect of the hydrous tax is presented in each panel. For a given scenario of the tax levied on anhydrous ethanol, the 9 panels describe all of the
Fig. A.3. Production ratio of hydrous to anhydrous ethanol over time: model results and historical developments. The confidence interval was calculated over 500
runs for the calibrated parameter values. Confidence interval: 90%.
Fig. A.2. Consumption ratio of hydrous to anhydrous ethanol over time: model results and historical developments. The confidence interval was calculated over 500
runs for the calibrated parameter values. Confidence interval: 90%.
Fig. A.4. Production ratio of sugar to ethanol over time: model results and historical developments. The confidence interval was calculated over 500 runs for the
calibrated parameter values. Confidence interval: 90%.
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Fig. B.2. Processing capacity of sugarcane as a function of time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol. Tax on
gasoline and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax= 0.1 R$/l. Dots and the err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation,
respectively. Forty repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
Fig. B.1. Processing capacity of sugarcane as a function of time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol. Tax on
gasoline and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax= 0. R$/l. Dots and the err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation,
respectively. Forty repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
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possible permutations among blend mandate and taxes levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol.
Figures below present the effect of anhydrous tax (i.e. 0 and 0.1 R$/l, respectively) on the processing capacity (Figs. B.1 and B.2), on con-
sumption patterns of the owners of flex vehicles (Figs. B.4 and B.5), and on the production of sugar (Figs. B.6 and B.7) and ethanol (Figs. B.8 and
B.9). Fig. B.3 presents spatial patterns in the deployment of new processing facilities for a simulation run other than one used in Fig. 6.
Fig. B.3. Location, year of installation, and processing capacity of sugarcane plants as a function of different combinations of blend mandate and gasoline tax. Tax on
gasoline in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Hydrous tax= 0.3 R$/l. Anhydrous tax= 0.05 R$/l. This figure shows the results for a simulation run different to that used
in Fig. 6.
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Fig. B.5. Percentage of drivers that consume E100 over time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol. Tax on
gasoline and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax= 0.1 R$/l. Dots and err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation,
respectively. Forty repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
Fig. B.4. Percentage of drivers that consume E100 over time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol. Tax on
gasoline and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax=0 R$/l. Dots and err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation, re-
spectively. Forty repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
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Fig. B.6. Total production of sugar in Brazil over time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol. Tax on gasoline
and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax=0 R$/l. Dots and err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation, respectively. Forty
repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
Fig. B.7. Total production of sugar in Brazil over time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol. Tax on gasoline
and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax= 0.1 R$/l. Dots and err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation, respectively. Forty
repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
J.A. Moncada et al. Energy Policy 123 (2018) 619–641
638
Fig. B.8. Production of hydrous (a) and anhydrous ethanol (b) over time for different combinations of blend mandate and tax levied on gasoline and hydrous ethanol.
Tax on gasoline and hydrous ethanol in R$/l. Blend mandate in %v/v. Anhydrous tax= 0 R$/l. Dots and err bars represent the mean and the standard deviation,
respectively. Forty repetitions were carried out in the simulations for each combination of policy instruments.
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